At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that in South
Darfur, civilian killings by political militias increased from 33% in
2018 to 57% in 2019, and that in West Darfur civilian killings by
political militias increased from 4% in 2019 to 68% in 2020. Looking
more closely at the raw data involving these political militia killings,
I was able to see that the vast majority of them were unable to be
identified as linked to the government or opposition, and so it is at
least in theory possible that state led killings of civilians remained,
carried out by sympathetic political militias acting on behalf of the
state who were able to hide their identities.
Also troubling is the trend of the proportion of civilian killings
carried out by identity group based militias surging as State Force
killings subsided. Identity militia killings of civilians increased from
23% of the overall share in 2019 in South Darfur to 77% in 2020, while
identity milita killings of civilians in West Darfur surged from 50% of
the overall share in 2018 to 85% in 2019. While the share of civilian
killings committed by identity militias decreased to 26% in 2020, they
once again dramatically surged to 93% in 2021 as the last UN bases were
closing.
What can be made of these findings? They may suggest that as UN
troops pulled out, and despite potentially improved political will by
State Forces to refrain from civilian killings, left to its own devices
the Government of Sudan may not have had the capacity on its own to fill
the power vacuums that emerged after UN troop and base withdrawals in
South and West Darfur to prevent civilian killings. Though not seen in
the above interactive visualization, in 2022, in West Darfur over 500
civilian killings occurred, many of which involved the Rizeigat Arab
militias in retaliatory attacks against other minority groups like the
Gimir and Masalit tribes. One such Rizeigat Arab militia attack on the
village of Al-Kereinik in April 2022 was alleged to have been directly
supported by the Rapid Support Forces - the leader of whom at that time
shared power in Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council. (Source: https://acleddata.com/2023/03/03/context-assessment-new-political-deal-amidst-rising-political-disorder-in-sudan/)
Since civil war broke out in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed
Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, killings of civilans on both sides
have increased. Even if the civil war ends soon, unless the Sudanese
government receives strong support for protecting civilians from
violence in South and West Darfur from either the UN or other entities
capable of strengthening the Sudanese government’s capacity to protect
civilians, identity group and political militias may continue the
bloodshed for years to come.